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Briefly Noted

13 March 1961

1. Ehrenburg on Humanism: In a broadcast marking his seventieth birthday, Ilya Ehrenburg, the well-known Soviet writer, stated: "Soviet society is engaged in a fight against a world based on the principle of material gain, on the rule of money. We must win not only through the perfection of our machines, through our cosmic travels, through prosperity, but also through our spiritual flights and the quality of human feelings, through beauty and inspiration." When the first man reached the moon, said Mr. Ehrenburg, the importance would lie not only in the fact of his having been able to arrive but in what kind of a man he was and what kind of spiritual resources he brought with him. Ehrenburg spoke scathingly of the banality of much Soviet art which he likened to fifth-rate colored photographs in splendid frames, "incapable of inspiring young Russians with love, duty, loyalty or highmindedness." "The fact that these pictures portray a pleasant-looking farmer in a semi-worsted suit instead of a stern-looking Marshal in dress uniform, does not constitute art." "Everyone knows," said Ehrenburg, "that the Fascists had to be removed; everyone understands that peace is essential but now that the building of a new society is almost completed and we have to think of how people should live in it, things become a bit more complicated." We should publicize Ehrenburg's statements in intellectual circles, contrasting them with the actual situation in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. We quote them to bloc intellectuals both as an example to be emulated and as a justification for similar assertions on their part.

2. Ehrenburg on Pasternak According to a Reuters despatch from Moscow, dated 1 March 1961, Ilya Ehrenburg defended Boris Pasternak in an article published in the magazine Noui Mir (New World), breaking a two-year Soviet silence on Pasternak. New World, organ of the Soviet Writers Union, published a five page extract from Ehrenburg's new autobiography. In it Ehrenburg stated he was convinced that Pasternak did not intend "to bring damage to his country" through Doctor Zhivago. Ehrenburg added the book contains "wonderful verses" and concluded "you cannot push Pasternak's verses away from the world. They live." (See Bi-Weekly #56, 31 January 1961, Item #349.)

3. Japan Pays Full Share of UN Congo Expenses: On 7 March the Kyodo News Agency Tokyo reported that the Japanese government had decided to pay its full share of expenses for the UN Congo expedition, waiving its privilege of receiving a 50% reduction. We should note this further indication of Asian dedication to the maintenance of the UN. Coupled with India's decision to supply troops for the Congo, this makes clear the fact that Soviet determination to undermine the UN will meet strong resistance. (See Bi-Weekly #56, 2 January 1961, Item #332.)

Background: On 14 February, at the opening session of the Indian Parliament, President Rajendra Prasad accused Peiping of "intransigence" and said: "We firmly hold that frontiers between India and China have been for long well established by treaties, custom, and usage." He insisted that India could not accept the "results of unilateral action or decisions taken by China." After he had spoken, Prime Minister Nehru presented parliament with a detailed document prepared by the Indian Government, 567 pages in length and containing the evidence and conclusions of six months of negotiations about their border dispute between Indian and Chicom officials. The report was accompanied by a thirteen-page statement by the Indian Foreign Office defending New Delhi's stand on the border issue. This statement asserted that the talks had established "beyond doubt" the traditional 22,500-mile long boundary between India and Communist China as shown on Indian maps. It charged that the Chicoms were in "unlawful occupation of about 12,000 square miles of Indian territory." This territory is in the Ladakh area of Kashmir on the Indian side of the India-Pakistan cease-fire line. (Peiping has claimed, in all, about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.) The lengthy Indian Government report brought out, among other things, the following points: India contends that there really is no border dispute because the boundary has been well defined and is supported by treaties, geography, and custom. India further maintains that the border runs along a natural watershed and that the Chicoms never even raised any question about it until 1959. Peiping's assertion, as reported by the Indian Government, is that no treaty exists between New Delhi and Peiping defining the border. (Peiping has also blamed British "imperialism" for having left the border question behind them when they departed from the Indian sub-continent.) The report also brought out two further points: it claimed that Peiping refused to accept India's treaty relations with the Himalayan principalities of Sikkim and Bhutan (Sikkim is an Indian protectorate: India also, while not interfering in the internal affairs of Bhutan, does control its defense and foreign relations); the Chicoms also reportedly refused to discuss with the Indians the border between Sinkiang and the part of Kashmir now occupied by Pakistan.

Guidance: The publication of this document by the Indian Government

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13 March 1961

360. Communist Chinese Claims to Korea as an Integral Part of China

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25X1C10b

**Background:** Since the thirteenth century, Korea, as well as all the lands now bordering on China proper, paid tribute to China. It was through this imperial system that the Chinese developed their concept of the Empire and it is largely from these old relationships that the Communists derive their territorial claims today. Among the numerous areas over which China lost control in the nineteenth century was Korea, which was occupied by Japan in 1895 and which remained under the control of the Japanese until 1945.

Mao Tse-tung set himself the task of remaking China, of reestablishing Chinese power and prestige and of regaining Chinese control over the old imperial boundaries by the application of pressure and, if necessary, by the use of armed force. Hardly a year after taking over power in China, Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet (October 1950) and only a few weeks later dispatched "volunteers" into Korea. Had he succeeded in defeating the Koreans, Korea - like Tibet - would today be part and parcel of the Chinese People's Republic. Proof of this lies in Mao's own claim, which he made in 1939, that scores of "national minorities", including the Koreans, are fundamentally Chinese and belong rightfully to China. (Mao Tse-tung in "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" published in Chinese, 15 November 1939.)

Although the 1931 constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic stated that, "the Soviet Government of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and the formation of an independent state for each national minority....all Koreans and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right of self-determination"; the constitution of 1954 changed all this and provides that, "the Chinese People's Republic is a unified national state...in areas where the people of the national minorities live in numbers, regional autonomy applies...all the areas of the national autonomy are inseparable parts of the Chinese People's Republic." The situation in Tibet provides an all too real example of the fate of so-called autonomous regions.

The Handbook of People's China, official guide to the Communist government operations, lists the Koreans among the most populous of the 64 ethnic groups which are scattered over more than 60% of the Chinese mainland. A special department, the Nationality Affairs Commission, was established in 1952 to communize and supervise the minority communities.

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25X1C10b

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13 March 1961

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25X1C10b

Background: On 4 March 1861 (19 February Old Style), Czar Alexander II issued an imperial decree, ending all serfdom in Russia, the last country in Europe to have the institution. As in Prussia 50 years before, emancipation was largely a consequence of military defeat, in this case in the Crimean War. Liberation led to striking changes in Russian institutions, and it, rather than the October Revolution, launched Russia on the path of modern development. Unfortunately, it was an incomplete liberation. The peasants' attitude had been that although they belonged to the landlord, the land belonged to them. But the liberation only gave them part of the land, and they had to repay the landlords for that part, at exaggerated prices, so that the landlords retained for forty-four years a measure of control over them. Henceforth they dreamed of a "black division" of the landlords' lands, which in their eyes had been "cut off." This felt injustice was one side of the Russian agrarian problem; the other, of which the peasants were largely unaware, was that since the communes (mirs) continued to farm with the traditional communal system, in which each peasant worked scattered narrow strips under the supervision of the Elder of the mir and the mir council, there remained a serious brake on agricultural progress and efficiency.

Some peasants began to shake off the mir's control and to develop concentrated farms (rather than strips) with secure tenure, and in the later Czarist period, this tendency was actively encouraged by the Minister Stolypin. By 1915, almost half the farms had become hereditary and non-communal, and Lenin feared that Stolypin's efforts to create a peasant bourgeoisie would succeed. But the war set the stage for a "black division" in 1917, with the Bolsheviks jumping on the bandwagon by endorsing peasant land seizure. The White forces never had much of a chance, since the peasants feared that if the Whites succeeded, the landlords would return. The old strip farming was doomed in any case, but the evolution before 1917 and after the Civil War was in the direction of larger, more concentrated, mechanized, private farms, with the poorer peasants working as hired hands or moving to the cities. Government measures, such as the extension of low-interest loans, might have minimized such undesirable accompanying phenomena as Kulak usury. But the trend was intolerable for the Communists, not so much because of social inequalities (although this was the argument used), as because it meant the firm establishment of private property and even capitalism on the land, and the existence of free peasants who would only surrender their produce in return for goods. Collectivization, applied after 1928, solved one old problem by conclusively eliminating the strips, but it revived another old problem by taking all the peasants' land away (except, as a concession after initial difficulties, the time-honored private gardens). Nominally there is collective ownership by all, but since every farm has high quotas to meet, the peasants are in effect serfs of the regime, whose only land is their gardens, repeatedly threatened with seizure. In typical Communist fashion, all local opponents of collectivization were stigmatized as Kulaks; this broke resistance, but crippled farming thereafter. Aside from the injustice involved in effectively seizing peasant lands, collectivization removed incentive from farming; as one expert has stated, the problem of providing incentives is "the major impediment to the efficient functioning of the

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13 March 1961

Kolkhoz system." This problem has in some respects grown worse with the amalgamation of farms in the 'fifties, placing more of the work in the hands of large brigades. The peasants, drawing on centuries of experience, try to circumvent the arbitrary system, with such typical results as the fact that in 1960, roughly half of the Soviet meat, milk and vegetable production came from the tiny private plots and private cattle.

25X1C10b

362. Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe

25X1C10b

Background: While military forces within the USSR were reduced during the first year of Khrushchev's "demobilization program", manpower of the Soviet forces in East Europe (Poland, Hungary and East Germany has been maintained at approximately the 1959 level and the over-all effectiveness of the Soviet command increased.

The strength of Soviet Group Forces in Germany includes a total of approximately 336,000 troops. Specifically: Motorized Rifle Divisions - 10; Tank Divisions - 10; Heavy Tanks - 1,120; Medium Tanks - 4,600; Artillery Pieces - 5,800; Jet Fighters - 524; Jet Light Bombers - 112.

Northern Group Forces (Poland) include a total of approximately 44,000 troops. Specifically: Motorized Rifle Divisions - 1; Tank Divisions - 1; Heavy Tanks - 95; Medium Tanks - 475; Artillery Pieces 225; Jet Fighters - 308; Jet Light Bombers - 000.

Southern Group Forces (Hungary) include a total of approximately 65,000 troops. Specifically: Motorized Rifle Divisions - 1; Tank Divisions - 3; Heavy Tanks - 285; Medium Tanks - 980; Artillery Pieces - 420; Jet Fighters - 216; Jet Light Bombers - 60.

Not only were no line units disbanded or transferred, but the forces have been strengthened by the continued introduction of improved tanks, guns and aircraft. Soviet units in East Europe are highly trained, well-equipped forces, maintained at a higher level of combat capability than the Soviet average and relatively immune to the short-term fluctuations in policy that affect Soviet forces elsewhere. In East Germany, such troops constitute an armored striking force with appropriate infantry, artillery and tactical air components. They are well organized and equipped to conduct either offensive action into Western Europe or a mobile defense of their own area. In Hungary, the recent conversion of a Soviet rifle division to a tank division suggest that the forces there are no longer serving primarily as an occupation force (their function since the 1956 Revolt). This command, by its present composition and disposition, forms a southward extension of the forces in Germany and increases Soviet capability for ground combat against Central Europe and the Mediterranean area. Soviet forces in Poland are organized to protect Soviet communication routes across that country. Soviet tactical air elements in East Germany, Poland and Hungary have increased their combat capability through the acquisition of new classes of fighters and through improvements in support and weapons systems. Training of both the ground and air elements in the three East European commands is intense and realistic.

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25X1C10b

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363. Crisis in the French Communist Party


Background: A schism has developed in the Communist Party between Maurice Thorez, the 61-year-old Secretary General, and his trusted lieutenants and close associates, Laurent Casanova and Marcel Servin. Casanova was the Politburo member responsible for the ideological direction of intellectuals, he had been a supporter and friend of Thorez for many years, he received the Lenin Peace Prize in December 1960. Marcel Servin, who was also a member of the Politburo and in charge of party organization, had once been secretary to Thorez. Others involved include: Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, Central Committee member, former National Assembly Deputy and, until the summer of 1960, editor-in-chief of the party weekly France Nouvelle; Madame Claudine Chomat, wife of Casanova and Central Committee member; Jean Pronteau, Central Committee member and former Deputy; Andre Souquiere, Central Committee member, former Senator and member of the Council of the Republic and a former secretary to Thorez; Jean Kanapa, Central Committee member, writer and philosopher and former editor-in-chief of La Nouvelle Critique; Jean-Pierre Vigier, Central Committee member, writer and research director of the National Center for Scientific Research.

On 24 February, it was announced that both Casanova and Servin had been dropped from the Politburo and that Servin had also been relieved of his duties as chief of the organization section. The immediate cause of the dispute is their disagreement with the total opposition of Thorez to De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Servin and Casanova have argued that the brunt of the party's attack should be directed at French rightists rather than against De Gaulle personally, whom they regard as the leader of the "liberal" faction of the bourgeoisie. Thorez on the other hand, prefers to see De Gaulle as the head of a regime of "nationalist demogogy," controlled by the "monopolies" and pursuing policies leading to fascism. The deviation charge developed from the disagreement over the French CP's decision to vote "no" in the January referendum on De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Casanova was charged with refusing to establish in the French peace movement a network of committees for peace in Algeria. Actually, the charges of "opportunism and deviationism," are based on long-standing differences, including - in addition to those concerning the Algerian War - the question of how to interpret the principle of "proletarian internationalism," internal contradictions in the French bourgeoisie, the question of "united front" tactics. The action taken against these senior party officials may also represent an attempt by Thorez to put them in a position where they would have little chance of succeeding to the leadership after his demise. The Central Committee meeting of 23-24 February also criticized Kriegel-Valrimont for his "thoroughly opportunistic assessments" of the nature of the "contradictions among the imperialists."

What measures, if any, the party has taken against other members of the group is not known. Of those listed so far, only Souquiere has recanted. The fact that the Central Committee resolution linked the failure of Casanova and Servin to correct their errors with the decision to demote (but not expel) them may indicate that the action was taken reluctantly. Support for Servin and

Casanova is evident among lower party echelons and Thorez apparently fears that more serious disciplinary action might provoke large-scale defections. Servin and Casanova claim that Thorez by his rigidity and intransigence in opposing De Gaulle, has caused the Communist leadership to lose touch with the Party rank and file. The party's condemnation of De Gaulle's self-determination policy for Algeria in September 1959 constituted a serious tactical error. Once this policy had been well received by the FLN in Algeria and had been approved by Khrushchev himself, Thorez was obliged to make a public volte-face which made the entire party look ridiculous.

Future developments within the French Communist Party cannot be forecast as yet. For the moment, Servin and Casanova remain in the party as Central Committee members. How much influence they can bring to bear on policy and to what extent they can develop support for their positions remains to be seen. It is unlikely, however, that Thorez can continue indefinitely to ignore the consequences of a revolt which has its roots in the attitude of the Party rank and file. 25X1C10b



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
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Background: The December 1960 issue of World Marxist Review, widely disseminated English-language edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism, the authoritative, theoretical publication of the world Communist movement sponsored by the CPSU with the assistance of most other Communist Parties and issued in Russian and at least twenty other languages, contains an article entitled: "The Reign of Terror in the United Arab Republic." Beginning with the statement that "The reactionaries have launched a violent offensive against democratic freedoms and civil rights in the UAR and especially in its Syrian region," it goes on to denounce the "reign of terror" launched in the UAR with police brutality that "surpasses the horrors of the inquisition." The article is signed by one "Said Mahmoud" but may or may not have been written by Khaled Bakdash, former leader of the Communist Party in Syria, who fled the country when it joined Egypt to form the UAR, Bakdash is now out of the UAR's reach in Communist territory, either in Prague or Moscow. One possible clue pointing to this conclusion is that the same issue of World Marxist Review contains another article entitled "We Will Build a National Front" as advocated by "the underground organ" of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party. Coming in for special attack in the "reign of terror" article was the allegedly brutal treatment meted out by the UAR Security authorities after they had arrested (in Damascus) Farajallah Helou, Lebanese "patriot" and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party. "The group that questioned Helou," the paper reports, "consisted of thirty men devoid of conscience and experienced in the art of interrogation." Helou, "it said, "was stripped naked and flogged until his body turned into bleeding pulp, then cold water was thrown over him and the beating resumed." The article points out that, contrary to what the UAR authorities claim, "the police persecute workers, peasants, students, trade unionists, writers and journalists who are remote from Communism." This article, which contains still more accounts of "terror, lawlessness and despotism," is directed toward audiences in a country which maintains substantial cultural contacts with the Soviet Union, and which both receives economic aid (such as the construction of the High Dam at Aswan), and looks to the USSR for military material of many sorts.

The allegations of police brutality in the UAR are perhaps best understood in the context of the Moscow Declaration of 6 December 1960, which was issued by the world conference of representatives of Communist parties. This document stated: "On behalf of all Communists of the world, the conference expresses feelings of proletarian solidarity with those who are languishing in prison torture chambers, the glorious sons and daughters of the working class, and the democrats of the United States, Spain, Portugal, Japan, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, the UAR, Jordan, Iraq, Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Union of South Africa, Sudan, and other countries." The charges against the UAR show that Communist propagandists were quick to carry out the new directive. However the Communist propagandists' attack has not been limited to the UAR. At one of the sessions of the Latin American People's Congress, sponsored by the Communist-front World Peace

Council in Mexico City during the first week of March 1961, a special report was presented on political prisoners in Mexico. (See also Item 355 of Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance, Issue #60, dated 27 February 1961, for recent attacks against the government of Iraq.) It is interesting to note that the UAR, Iraq, and Mexico were specifically named in the statement quoted above, in addition to the more usual targets of Communist propaganda attack. Apparently, the new directive is designed to provide a convenient theme for attacking any regime, including those who seek to have good relations with Moscow, whenever it suits the Communists to do so.



25X1C10b

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13 March 1961

ADDENDUM

CROSS-INDEX

- 359. CHINA: Expansionist Policy Denounced by Indian Government - A, F.
- 360. Communist Chinese Claims to Korea as an Integral Part of China - A, U.
- 361. The Centenary of the Emancipation of the Russian Serfs - E, V.
- 362. Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe - C, E.
- 363. Crisis in the French Communist Party - B, H.
- 364. Leading Moscow Publication Attacks UAR - F.

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